Acerca de la distinción entre la capacidad de juzgar determinante y reflexionante en Kant
Metadatosítem / registro completo
//// Abstract: The central thesis is that already in the Critique of Pure Reason does the need for the distinction between determining and reflecting uses of Judgment arise, although its nominal formulation appears only later in the second introduction to the Critique of Judgment. The interpretative importance of this thesis lies in that, contrary to most interpretations, which claim that the distinction lies in the nature of such judgments, the author thinks of it as differentiated exercises of an identical capacity of judgment, and even as a difference that must be appreciated in the products of such capacity. Thus, any judgment of objects may at once be determining and reflecting, according to the kind of application of the concepts involved in each case. In brief, although reflection does not properly belong in the conditions of possibility of objective judgment, it is indispensable to fix the conceptual place of the particular in judgment.
Palabras clave: Filosofía; Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía;
Mendiola, Carlos. “Acerca de la distinción entre la capacidad de juzgar determinante y reflexionante en Kant.” Theoría: Revista del Colegio de Filosofía 8-9 (1999): 79-99
Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
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