

Revolution and Repetition

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1. Repetition in the State

Historians often say that those who don't know history are likely to repeat it. But does this mean that by knowing history, we can we thereby avoid its repetition? Or is there really such a thing as the repetition of history? This kind of problem has never been thought through; historians, who are supposed to be scientific, have never addressed it, even if they intuitively acknowledge it. I believe that there is a repetition of history, and that it is possible to treat it *scientifically*. What is repeated is, to be sure, not an event but the structure, or the repetitive structure. Surprisingly, when a structure is repeated, the event often appears to be repeated as well. However, it is only the repetitive structure that can be repeated.

Marx is the thinker who attempted to elucidate the repetitive structure. It is generally thought that Marx's view of history is based on developmental stages, and not concerned with repetition. But he did think through the problem of repetition, which appeared in one of his early works, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. The opening sentences of the text refer precisely to the *repetition of history*: "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce."

Here Marx emphasizes that what happened between the French Revolution of 1789 and Napoleon's coronation was repeated sixty years later

by the process of the revolution of 1848 that resulted in Louis Bonaparte's coronation. There are, however, more repetitions. In the first place, the process of the first French Revolution followed the pattern of ancient Rome's history; these are repetitions as re-presentation. But it is not because the past design was adopted that these repetitions occurred: these repetitions are not concerned merely with the problem of representation. Representation becomes actual repetition only when there is a structural similarity between the past and the present, that is to say, only when there is a repetitive structure inherent to the nation that transcends the consciousness of each individual.

It is probably in *Philosophy of History* that Hegel wrote what Marx referred to: "by repetition, that which at first appeared merely a matter of chance and contingency, becomes a real and ratified existence." Hegel refers to the event in which Octavian became the first Roman Emperor after his adoptive father, Caesar, had been assassinated in his attempt to be the emperor. Caesar sought to become emperor when the city of Rome could no longer maintain the republican principles in its expansion, and was murdered by those who chose to defend the republic, including Brutus. It is only after the assassination of Caesar, however, that the Roman people accepted the empire and emperor as inevitable reality. Caesar never became the emperor, but his name became a general noun that signifies emperor (czar, Kaiser). Marx might have forgotten this context when he wrote that "Hegel remarks somewhere."

Nonetheless, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Marx finds repetition in the emergence of the empire out of the republic realized by

the French Revolution. In the Revolution of 1789, the *King* was executed and the *Emperor* emerged from the subsequent republic with the people's support. This is what Freud called the "return of the repressed." Yet, the *Emperor* is the return of the murdered king, but is no longer the king himself. The emperor stands for an Empire that transcends the boundaries of the city-state or nation-state. It is because of this structure that Caesar's event appears to be repeated in other places and times. For example, Napoleon, who gained power in the French Revolution and its subsequent wars, attempted to counter British industrial capitalism by establishing a *European union*: Napoleon crowned himself emperor and established an Empire not because he was mindful of the past but because of the politico-economical situation of the time.

Indeed, Napoleon's concept could be called a prototype of the European Union, but at this point in history, his scheme could be more properly seen as the precursor of Hitler's *Third Reich*: the conquest of Europe. Concerning this point, Hannah Arendt states the following: "The Napoleonic failure to unite Europe under the French flag was a clear indication that conquest by a nation led either to the full awakening of the conquered people's national consciousness and to consequent rebellion against the conqueror, or to tyranny. And though tyranny, because it needs no consent, may successfully rule over foreign peoples, it can stay in power only if it destroys first of all the national institutions of its own people".

Napoleon's war of conquest can be called the first example of a nation-state's imperialistic expansion resulting in another nation-state. In the twentieth century, imperialism thus produced nation-states all over the world.

Generally speaking, modern states were formed by separating themselves from the old world empires. States derived from the same world empire share a common cultural religious background even if they compete with one another. If they were threatened by a state originating from another world empire, they would nevertheless be united based on the identity of the old world empire. In a word, they return to the Empire. But if a nation-state expands itself and tries to become an Empire, it cannot avoid becoming imperialistic. Thus the modern nation-state, on the one hand, subsists in its reaction to the Empire, but, on the other hand, is inclined to abolish itself and return to the Empire. This paradoxical structure causes the repetition inherent to the state.

2. Repetition in Capital

Marx refers to another repetition in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*: the crisis of 1851. This economic crisis helped Bonaparte gain support from the state apparatuses, such as the military and the bureaucracy. "Only under the second Bonaparte does the state seem to have made itself completely independent. As against civil society, the state machine has consolidated its position...." It is at this point that Marx discovers the encounter between the two kinds of repetitiveness: repetitiveness of the state and that of capitalist economy. No one at that time paid attention to the repetitiveness of this phenomenon called a crisis. It was assumed that the commercial crisis was the result of the revolution of 1848 and resolvable by economic policies.

Marx did not sufficiently investigate the problem of the periodical crisis.

He believed that the general crisis would bring about the world revolution in Europe and waited for the coming crisis. No revolution, however, took place, although a crisis indeed occurred in 1857. The crisis is a serious problem for capitalist economy, but it neither destroys the system nor automatically yields revolutions. On the contrary, a severe crisis or depression leads to counter-revolution. The incidents mentioned in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* attest to the fact that the economic crisis facilitates the establishment of a state capitalist order, such as Bonaparte's, rather than a socialist revolution.

Marx's study of capitalist economy became sophisticated after 1857, when he abandoned his eschatological hope for such a crisis. It was after this period that Marx started investigating the crisis or the business cycle on its own, independently of the political. A crisis is not a mistake of economic policy, and does not lead to the collapse of capitalism. Marx began to conceive of crisis as an inevitable sickness inherent in the accumulation of capital. Then why is there such a thing as crisis?

Most Marxists suppose that crisis is caused by anarchic overproduction or the "contradiction between socialized production and capitalistic appropriation." Yet, this idea explains the *possibility* of crisis, but not the cause of its periodic occurrence. As far as I know, only Kozo Uno gave a convincing answer to this mystery. He explored the problem of crisis and the business cycle in terms of the population law of capitalism. Labor is a peculiar commodity; it is difficult to increase it immediately in a shortage and difficult to decrease it when it is overstocked. Workers dismissed in a recession comprise

the "reserve army of labor." During periods of prosperity employment increases, wages rise, and the rate of profit drops, but since credit is still good, capital continues to produce according to the appearance of demand. Eventually, credit is ruined and a crisis takes place, suddenly revealing that commodities were being overproduced. Every crisis, therefore, emerges as a credit crisis, but the cause of the periodic crisis in industrial capitalism lies in the peculiarity of the labor commodity.

A crisis and its subsequent depression bankrupt and weed out fragile businesses that cannot secure their own profits. By lowering wages and the interest rate, however, the depression allows capital to invest in new equipment and technology. Eventually prosperity returns, and another crisis occurs. Thus capital accumulation or the advanced "organic composition of capital" is guided by the business cycle. From this perspective, the crisis does not destroy capitalism but is an indispensable process for capital accumulation. Conversely, what is applauded as the automatic adjustment apparatus of capitalist economy signifies the fact that capital accumulation can only proceed violently.

Now it is clear that the periodical crisis occurs in a wage labor economy. Why then did the crises take place at intervals of approximately ten years? And why is it that after the crises of 1857, 1866, and 1873, a chronic depression ensued instead of a dramatic crisis? These questions can be answered in terms of the primary product or the world commodity. The classical periodical crisis emerged when the cotton industry was dominant. The cotton industry demanded a large amount of labor; the plants and equipments would wear out

about every ten years and need to be renewed. From the 1860s, however, a transition to heavy industries took place which caused an increase in equipment investment (constant capital) and a decrease in the average rate of profit, even when labor productivity (the rate of surplus value) rose. Likewise, since the heavy industries do not need as much labor as the cotton industry does, unemployment increases and domestic consumption decreases. Consequently, the depression became chronic. Furthermore, the products of heavy industries required overseas markets. This is called "the export of capital". In this case it was the state's role to secure these markets. As a result, severe conflicts arose between the countries already in possession of colonies overseas, such as Britain, France and the Netherlands, and the newly growing powers, such as Germany, America, and Japan. This is what is called *imperialism*.

The business cycle Marx grasped in *Capital* takes the form of a short wave that was later called Juglar cycle. On the other hand, Kondratieff pointed out the "long wave" that has a fifty- or sixty-year cycle. In my view, the difference of length is not important. The long wave is a phenomenon that is caused by the change of the world commodities. The transitions of *world commodities*, from wool, to cotton, to heavy industries, to durable consumer goods, and the information industry, have resulted in the long severe depressions, if not crises. This transition causes change not only at the level of technology but also of society in general. In spite of the difference in appearance, the basic principle that Marx pointed out is still relevant: capital accumulation is possible only through violent reconfiguration, and this is

exactly what compels capitalist society to repeat itself. Nonetheless, this principle does not suffice to probe the repetition of history as social formation.

3. Social Formation viewed through Mode of Exchange

In *Capital* Marx provided a far more profound insight into the repetitiveness of capitalist economy, than he does in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Yet, the repetitiveness at the level of the state, which had been set forth in *The Eighteenth*, was never mentioned again by Marx. The state was regarded as merely a superstructure determined by the economic structure. Generally speaking, Marxists sees the state or the nation as a political or ideological superstructure determined by the economical substructure, that is, the mode of production. This view, however, is not only inapplicable to pre-capitalist society but also insufficient for capitalist society. It is clear that the state or the nation functions according to its own logic, which is different from capital. In fact Marxist movements have largely ignored the significance of the state and the nation. They occasionally affirm that the politico-ideological superstructure has "relative autonomy," but it has never been thought through why the state has *autonomy*. This difficulty is caused by Marx's perspective, which sees history through "modes of production." As long as we keep this perspective, the state and the nation remain a mystery.

In *Transcritique*, I proposed that we consider the history of social formation from the perspective of modes of exchange, instead of modes of production. Briefly, there are three basic modes of exchange: reciprocity of gift and return; plunder and redistribution; and commodity exchange (see figure

1). In my view, every social formation exists as a juncture of these exchange modes, and differences between them depend on what the primary mode is and how those modes are related. In the capitalist social formation, commodity exchange is dominant, but the other modes of exchange and their derivatives still exist in modified form. The state becomes a modern state, and the dissolved community becomes a nation as an imagined community.

Figure1: Modes of exchange

B plunder-redistribution	A reciprocity (gift-return)
C commodity exchange (money-commodity)	D X

Thus the three modes of exchange are transformed into the trinity of capital, nation and state. From this point of view, it is obvious that the state has an autonomy that is totally different from that of capital. They are rooted in different principles of exchange. Marx in *Capital* abstracted capital away from the state and the nation by bracketing the dimensions of other exchange modes because he is attempting to grasp the system caused by commodity exchange in its purity. It is better, though, to explore how each of the other modes of exchange forms a system (as Marx did concerning the system of capitalist economy), than to complain of his not dealing with the state and the

nation. The anthropologists, such as Marcel Mauss or Levi-Strauss, for example, have attempted to describe the reciprocal composition of society. We should begin the same work regarding the state.

As stated above, the periodical crisis does not take place until society is completely re-organized by the mode of commodity exchange and the commodification of labor. Differently put, it is not until capitalist economy experiences the periodical crisis that it can manifest its *autonomy*. The same principle applies to the state's autonomy: only the repetition proper to it can attest that the state is autonomous.

4. Historical Stages of Capitalism

The history of social formation must be viewed by considering the relation between the two subjects: the state and capital. The repetitiveness of the state and that of capital should be examined at the same time. The state and capital are in a complementary relation, even while they are opposed to each other. Neither of them can be reduced to the other.

In *Capital*, Marx bracketed the state in order to grasp the mechanism of capitalist economy purely, but when it comes to seeing the actual capitalist social formations, we must reintroduce the state as an active agent. But, instead of doing so, Marxists tried to grasp the historical change of capitalist economy in order to explain changes in the political superstructure. It is generally considered that the capitalist economy has marked the historical stages of development as follows; namely, mercantilism, industrial capitalism, imperialism, late capitalism, etc.

From a different viewpoint, these stages can also be characterized by changes in the *world commodity*. The stage of mercantilism is characterized by the wool industry, industrial capitalism by the cotton industry, imperialism by heavy industry, and late capitalism by durable consumer goods, such as automobiles and electrical appliances. A new stage of late capitalism began in the in 1980s, in which *information* became the world commodity. The chart below demonstrates these stages (Figure 1).

These changes basically correspond to the development of productive power, and changes in political superstructure are explained upon this basis. But from such a perspective, it is impossible to grasp the repetitive structure I mentioned. Meanwhile, it may be said that Immanuel Wallerstein reintroduced the state as an agent that exists side by side with capital. He thereby reconsidered changes in social formations from the perspective of a world system constituted by state and capital. This is how he came to view the history of the modern world system in terms of the shifts from one hegemonic state to another. Previously, Marxists had thought that of the 19th century as a stage characterized by liberalism, while the late 19th century was marked by a shift to imperialism. In fact, liberalism (free trade policy) was British policy; other nations were either protectionist, or they were in the process of being colonized. If we may characterize the 19th century by British economic policy, it is because Britain was a hegemon in world capitalism.

Liberalism is a policy employed by a hegemon. If so, liberalism must be possible in any period. Wallerstein thinks so. In his view, there were only three hegemons in the modern global economy. In other words, only three

states adopted liberalism: the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. Between the latter half of the sixteenth century and the mid-seventeenth century, when Britain had mercantilist or protectionist policies, the Netherlands was liberal; politically it was not an absolute monarchy but a republic. In fact, Descartes and Locke sought refuge in Amsterdam, where Spinoza could also find a home.

Wallerstein observed hegemony in three spheres: manufacturing, commerce, and then finance. In his view, a state first establishes hegemony in manufacturing, and then proceeds to commerce and finance. A hegemon is the state which gains superiority in all spheres. But it does not last for long. At the same time, it does not fall suddenly, because even though a state loses hegemony in production, hegemony in commerce and finance can still be retained.

For example, the Dutch maintained hegemony in commerce and finance even after Britain overwhelmed them in the manufacturing sphere in the latter half of the eighteenth century. It was in the nineteenth century (during the stage called "liberalism") that Britain dominated them completely. However, if the period of British hegemony is called liberalism, the same term should be applied to the period of Dutch hegemony.

Mercantilism, on the other hand, is the period of the absence of a hegemon, that is, the period when the Netherlands lost hegemony, and Britain and France consequently fought to attain it. The absence of a hegemon can also be found at the stage called imperialism after 1870, in which Britain lost hegemony in the manufacturing industry, and America, Germany, and Japan

began to fight for hegemony. In this perspective, it is no wonder that a similarity can be found between the stages of mercantilism and imperialism.

Development in the stages of capitalism cannot be purely linear. These developments require not only changes of world commodity but also long depression. That is to say, it requires a repetition inherent to the capitalist system. On the other hand, it entails mortal struggles for hegemony among the states and therefore repetition inherent in the dimension of the state. Accordingly, the stages of world capitalism can be seen as the repetition of the stages of *imperialism* and *liberalism* (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: The World-Historical Stages of the State-Capitalism

	1750-1810	1810-1870	1870-1930	1930-1990	1990-
World Capitalism	Mercantilism	Liberalism	Imperialism	Late Capitalism	Neo-imperialism
Hegemon		Britain		USA	
Economic Policy	Imperialistic	Liberalistic	Imperialistic	Liberalistic	Imperialistic
Capital	Merchant Capital	Industrial Capital	Financial Capital	State Monopoly	Multi-national
World Commodity	Wool Industry	Cotton Industry	Heavy Industries	Durable Goods	Information
State	Absolute Monarch	Nation-state	Imperialism	Welfare-state	Regionalism

In this chart, for example, *mercantilism* is a transitional stage from Dutch to British liberalism, that is, a stage in which the Netherlands were declining but Britain and France were not yet powerful enough to replace it and struggled against each other. Also, the stage of *imperialism* after 1870 is

marked by Britain's decline and the attempt by Germany, America, and Japan to re-divide the territories formerly held by the previous imperial powers.

The stages of world capitalism thus form not only the linear development of production but also the alternation between the stages of *liberalism* and *imperialism*. In my view, this alternation operates in a sixty-year cycle. As a result, the history of the modern world appears to repeat itself every one hundred and twenty years. It is uncertain that this cycle will continue, but it might be productive as a heuristic hypothesis.

5. The Current Stage

The 1990s is considered the stage of *neoliberalism*. It is often said that America, like the old British Empire, so overwhelmingly holds the hegemony that its policies are representative of *liberalism*. While America was the hegemon before 1990, it started declining economically from the 1970s, as was indicated by the end of the gold standard system in 1971. America is following the course that the Netherlands and Britain once trod: while declining in manufacturing industries, American retains hegemony in finance and commerce of natural resources, such as oil, grain, or energy.

During the age of British liberalism, war posed no danger to Britain. Between 1930 and 1990 (especially between 1945 and 1975), America was as liberal as nineteenth century Britain. The developed capitalist states were under American protection, cooperated with each other by regarding the Soviet bloc as the enemy, and adopted the domestic policies of worker protection and social welfare. Contrary to appearances, the international

Soviet bloc and domestic socialist parties stabilized world capitalism, rather than threatening it. The Cold War is therefore the stage of *liberalism* with America as the hegemon. Since the 1980s, Reaganite or Thatcherite policies, such as retrenchment of social welfare, deregulation of capital, or tax reduction, have been adopted in the advanced capitalist states. These policies are generally considered neoliberal, but they are not inconsistent with the imperialism that was dominant in the 1880s. As a matter of fact, there was social welfare at the time of liberalism in Britain and the United States.

Lenin insisted that the stages of imperialism could be historically characterized by "capital export": capital seeks the global market because the domestic market is never sufficient for it. Arendt described the imperialism of the 1880s as the liberation of a state tied to capital, from the yoke of the nation. Rejecting the nation's demands, the state abandoned its domestic workers and lent economic and military support to the capital that went abroad. This is also happening in the neoliberal stage.

Globalization started in the 1970s, when the advanced countries suffered a falling rate of profit and chronic depression due to the saturation of the market with durable consumer goods because of significant development in Japan and Germany. As a result, American capital had to find its way in the global free market. This global competition, however, is impossible without recourse to military hegemony. The current stage of capitalism is more *neoimperial* than *neoliberal*.

According to Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, America acted not as an imperialist state but like the Roman Empire because it sought the approval of

the United Nations in the Gulf War of 1991 in spite of the fact that it had overwhelming military hegemony. However, I cannot agree with the idea that the United States of America is not imperialism but Empire. No nation or state can avoid falling into imperialism if it attempts to become Empire. Ten years after the Gulf War, in effect, the Iraq War disproved the idea that America is not imperialism but Empire: America pursued *unilateralism* rather than approval from the United Nations.

To be sure, Negri and Hardt do not pursue the idea of the American Empire; for them, Empire is a place that has no place. The empire is nothing other than the world market. They say: "In its ideal form there is no outside to the world market: the entire globe is its domain. We might thus use the form of the world market as a model for understanding imperial sovereignty.... In this smooth space of Empire, there is no *place* of power —it is both everywhere and nowhere. Empire is an *ou-topia*, or really a *non-place*."]

In this empire as world market, states have no importance. A similar remark can be found in the 1848 *Communist Manifesto* by Marx and Engels, which predicted that the differences of peoples and states would be annulled in the "intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations." This view ignores the dimensions of the state and nation. The revolutions of 1848, for example, resulted in state capitalism and imperialism in France and Germany rather than annulling the differences between peoples and states.

Today the framework of the nation-state is said to be debilitated. It is true that the element of the nation has been discarded, but this does not at all mean that the state is dissolved. It is only by the will of the state as such that

one state can ally itself with another state. There was never a state that rejected alliance or subordination when its own survival was at stake. Only the nation as the "imagined community" rejects it.

The theorists of the European Union argue that the Union transcends the modern sovereign state. As the nation-state is forced into existence by *global economy*, however, so is the regional union of the states. In order to counter America and Japan, the European states formed the European Union and delegated their economic and military powers to the super state. This cannot be called sublation of the modern state. For it is under the pressure of world capitalism or the world market that the states unite and establish a *bloc state*.

The European Union is not the first bloc state in history; it is predated by Germany's "Third Reich" and Japan's "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere," both of which were planned in the 1930s in order to counter the *bloc economies* of Britain, France, and America. Before the war, these bloc states represented themselves as overcoming the "modern world-system," that is, capitalism and the nation-state. The design for a European union existed even before Napoleon; its ideal is the old *Empire*, though it has only been actualized in French or German *imperialism*.

In forming the European Union, the Europeans do not thereby forget the past. It is obvious that they are trying to actualize an Empire that is not imperialistic. Nonetheless, the Union is nothing but a *bloc state* framed within global economy. Other regions are in the same situation: the old world Empires of China, Indian, Ottoman, and Russia, which were marginalized in

the modern world system, have reappeared.

In each region, since the nation-state was formed by separating itself from the world empire, there is on the one hand a shared *civilization* and on the other hand, a past full of divisions and struggles. The states bracket their memories as nations and form a community by reducing their own sovereignty. Yet, this phenomenon occurs precisely due to the pressure of world capitalism that now dominates the states. Renan once pointed out that oblivion of history is necessary for a nation to be built; his remark is applicable to the formation of the bloc state: just like the nation, it is also an "imagined" or created community. Such a restoration of the empires becomes salient, as the United States declines. We have entered into the "imperialistic" stage in which there is no hegemon, and empires compete for the next hegemony. 120 years ago, this situation led up to the First World War, which made the United States a new hegemon. Hence a question; will it be repeated again? My answer is Yes and No. I say "Yes", because it is certain that the strife for hegemony among the empires will be redoubled. I say "No", because it is unlikely that the next hegemon will emerge from these competitions.

For instance, Giovanni Arrighi predicts that China will be the next hegemon in place of the United States. But I don't agree with him. No doubt China and India will be economic giants overwhelming the other empires, but as to whether China or India becomes a hegemon, that is another story. To begin with, for one nation to become a hegemon requires something more than economic preeminence alone. But the greater reason is that the very development of China and India confront world capitalism with the end of itself.

The cycle I have been talking about is peculiar to capitalist accumulation. As the latter ends, so does the repetitious cycle.

Marx showed the process of capitalist accumulation in the formula $M-C-M'$. This means that so long as it multiplies, capital can be capital, but otherwise it can't. There are three premises which made self-multiplication of industrial capital possible. The first premise is that natural resources outside the industrial system are infinite and inexhaustible. The second premise is that "human resources" outside the capitalist market economy are inexhaustible. This ensures the infinite potential of cheap labor and new consumers. The third premise is that technological innovation is limitless. This provides the relative surplus value with industrial capital.

These three premises, however, are being rapidly undermined. Regarding the first premise, its demise appears as crises such as shortages in resources and energy and also, as environmental crisis such as climate change and desertification. These crises will certainly become more serious. As for the second premise, when the world's agricultural nations with the largest populations, namely, China and India, develop into industrial societies, this will entail the rise of labor force value, and stagnation of consumption. The world capitalism has critically stagnated since the 1970s. This is proved by the fact that the long-term interest rate has remained low. The world capitalism tried to survive by globalization, especially entangling China and India into the world market. But in the near future, there will be no room for further economic growth. Therefore, the world capitalism as a whole is nearing its final limit.

Of course, such limitations will not automatically bring capitalist economy to an end. The fact that industrial capitalism has a fatal limit is one thing, but the fact that it ends is another thing. When we consider the actual society and economy, we should take into account the state as the active agent. When capitalism is in crisis, the state will attempt to shore it up by all means. In this case, what is most likely is the world war. Then, our most important and imminent task will be to create the transnational system to deter war, which is caused by the crisis of capitalism.

6. Repetition in Revolution

I have so far been discussing the repetitiveness of state and capital. Finally I would like to discuss the repetitiveness of the counter movement against state and capital. Of course this repetitiveness is caused by that of state and capital. In this respect, Wallerstein's remark is suggestive: the revolution of 1968 is equivalent to that of 1848. According to him, the revolution of 1968 did not aim at achieving political power, but was a movement against the system and therefore became widely influential. The revolution of 1848, too, failed to gain political power, but as a result, brought about universal suffrage, legalization of labor unions, and welfare policies. Moreover, the revolution of 1968 revived various kinds of socialism and utopianism, including the young Marx's thought, which had been repressed since 1848.

I would like to take special note of the fact that the revolution of 1968 broke out exactly one hundred and twenty years after the revolution of 1848.

Wallerstein would probably reject my hypothesis of the sixty-years and one-hundred-and-twenty-years cycles since he conceives the periodicity based on Kondratieff's long wave. Yet, the similarity between 1848 and 1968 is not a mere accident; it corresponds to the periodicity of the stages of the state and capital dyad. It should be noted that about sixty years before 1848, the French Revolution took place, and that about sixty years after 1848, the Russian Revolution took place. These events can be charted as the following.

I: 1789 French Revolution (Kant, *To Perpetual Peace*. 1795)

L: 1848

I: 1917 Russian Revolution (League of Nations, 1920)

L: 1968

Wallerstein regarded the world revolution of 1848 as the sublation of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1917 as the sublation of 1848, and the world revolution of 1968 as the sublation of 1917. But it is futile to see these events in a successive order: the A series is located at the *imperialism* stage while the B series at the *liberalism* stage. The difference and repetitiveness are important when we consider the period after 1990.

Let us begin with the series L (liberalism). These revolutions happened basically at the stage of *liberalism* when Britain or America achieved hegemony; these are the first occurrences of the proletariat's countermovement against capitalism, but without prospect to seize the state power. At this point, these revolutions were utterly defeated, but they still had

other significance. The subjects of the struggle in 1968 were not proletarian in the narrow sense, but students and those who were discriminated against in terms of gender, ethnicity, race, or sexuality. To borrow Negri and Hardt's word, the revolution was the rebellion of the multitude. As its result, state welfare capitalism was further facilitated in each country. "Neoliberalism" after 1980s is precisely the repercussion by the state-capital dyad, that is, the liberation from the nation.

When we consider the series I (imperialism), we see that the revolution of 1789 broke out at the period when Britain and France was struggling for hegemony. The revolution resulted in a war that aimed at making France an empire that could compete with Britain. The revolution of 1917, on the other hand, occurred as a result of the First World War. The Russian revolution is considered the world-historical event. It is equal to the French revolution in 1789.

But we should not forget that there was another world-historical event as the result of the First World War; that is the League of Nations. And you know that the idea of the League of Nations came from Kant. Kant published the book "The Permanent Peace" in 1795, during the war that broke out with the French Revolution. Now you can notice the parallel between the French Revolution and Kantian plan for permanent peace, and the Russian Revolution and the League of Nations. This shows the repetitive structure.

Considering this repetitive structure, what can we anticipate in the near future in the neo-imperialist stage since 1990? Negri and others may think of the world revolution as the global rebellion of multitudes. But what is most

likely to happen is the world war among the empires. So we need to think of preventing the war first and foremost. In this regard, I think that the line of Kantian idea is important. So far Marxists attached importance to the Russian Revolution and to restoring it somehow or other in the future. And they have been making little of the League of Nations, or its successor, United Nations. Marxists would say that the United Nations have nothing to do with communism, unlike the Russian Revolution. But I think that Kantian idea of the federation of states is more revolutionary and concerned with communism.

The Russian Revolution was a revolution that tried to abolish the state from within. But it is impossible to abolish the state from within, because a state exists vis-à-vis other states. And this gives the state its autonomy. For instance, even if a revolution to abolish a state takes place, it must reinforce the state to defend the revolution from the other states which interfere and seek to destroy it. That was the case with the Russian Revolution, which produced a powerful state. This was engendered by a Marxist way of thinking that belittled the autonomy of the state.

On the other hand, the Kantian idea of permanent peace was meant to supersede the state. For what Kant calls "the permanent peace" is not just the absence of war, but the "end of all hostilities", in which there is no state, and in which the Hobbesian state of nature ends. Acknowledging that a state exists vis-à-vis other states, Kant thought out how to contain the states, conceiving the federation of states. Kant presented this as a realistic first step toward the "World Republic", in which the state and capital are superseded. Needless to

say, the League of Nations was powerless and so is the United Nations today. But we should not deny it for that reason. We should rather regard the United Nations as a process of superseding the states and propel it forward, by connecting to it all the counter-movements against the state and capital in each nation. Such a movement is vital in the neo-imperialist period.